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1. INTRODUCTION 
Fifth generation computers must be fast, reliable, and flexible. One way to achieve 
these goals is to build them out of a small number of basic modules that can be 
assembled together to realize machines of various sizes. The use of multiple modules 
can make the machines not only fast, but also achieve a substantial amount of fault 
tolerance. The system architecture and software for such machines are described 
below. 
1.1. System Architect;ure 
The price of processors and memory is decreasing at an incredible rate. Extrapolating 
from the current trend, it is likely that a single board containing a powerful CPU, a 
substantial fraction of a megabyte of memory, and a fast network interface will be 
available for a manufacturing cost of less than $100 in 1990. Our intention is there-
fore to do research on the architecture and software of machines built up of a large 
number of such modules. 
In particular, we ·envision three classes of machines: (1) personal computers consist-
ing of a high-quality bit-map display and a few processor-memory modules; (2) 
departmental machines consisting of hundreds of such modules; and (3) large main-
frames consisting of thousands of them. The primary difference between these 
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machines is the number of modules, rather than the type of the modules. In principle, 
any of these machines can be gracefully increased in size to improve performance by 
adding new modules or decreased in size to allow removal and repair of defective 
modules. The software running on the various machines should be in essence identi-
cal. Furthermore, it should be possible to connect different machines together to form 
even larger machines and to partition existing machines into disjoint pieces when 
necessary, all in a way transparent to the user level software. 
This model is superior to the oft-proposed "Personal Computer Model," in a number 
of ways. In the personal computer model, each user has a dedicated minicomputer, 
complete with disks, in his office or at home. Unfortunately, when people work 
together on large projects, having numerous local file systems can lead to multiple, 
inconsistent copies of many programs. Also, the noise generated by disks in every 
office, and the maintenance problems generated by having machines spread all over 
many buildings can be annoying. 
Furthermore, computer usage is very bursty: most of the time the user does not 
need any computing power, but once in a while he may need a very large amount of 
computing power for a short time (e.g., when recompiling a program consisting of 100 
files after changing a basic shared declaration). The fifth generation computer we pro-
pose is especially well suited to bursty computation. When a user has a heavy compu-
tation to do, an appropriate number of processor-memory modules are temporarily 
assigned to him. When the computation is completed, they are returned to the idle 
pool for use by other users. 
1.2. System Software 
A machine of the type described above requires radically different system software 
than existing machines. Not only must the operating system effectively use and 
manage a very large number of processors, but the communication and protection 
aspects are very different from those of existing systems. 
Traditional networks and distributed systems are based on the concept of two 
processes or processors communicating via connections. The connections are typically 
managed by a hierarchy of complex protocols, usually leading to complex software and 
extreme inefficiency. (An effective transfer rate of 0.1 megabit/sec over a 10 
megabit/sec local network, which is only 1% utilization, is frequently barely achiev-
able.) 
We reject this traditional approach of viewing a distributed system as a collection of 
discrete processes communicating via multilayer (e.g., ISO) protocols, not only because 
it is inefficient, but because it puts too much emphasis on specific processes, and by 
inference, on processors. Instead we propose to base the software design on a different 
conceptual model - the object model. In this model, the system deals with abstract 
objects, each of which has some set of abstract operations that can be performed on it. 
Associated with each object are one or more "capabilities" [Dennis66] which are 
used to control access to the object, both in terms of who may use the object and 
what operations he may perform on it. At the user level, the basic system primitive is 
performing an operation on an object, rather than such things as establishing connec-
tions, sending and receiving messages, and closing connections. For example, a typical 
object is the file, with operations to read and write portions of it. 
The object model is well-known in the programming languages community under 
the name of "abstract data type" [Liskov74]. This model is especially well-suited to a 
distributed system because in many cases an abstract data type can be implemented 
on on~ of the processor-memory modules described above. When a user process exe-
cutes one of the visible functions in an abstract data type, the system arranges for the 
necessary underlying message transport from the user's machine to that of the 
abstract data type and back. The header of the message can specify which operation 
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is to be performed on which object. This arrangement gives a very clear separation 
between users and objects, and makes it impossible for a user to directly inspect the 
representation of an abstract data type by bypassing the functional interface. 
A major advantage of the object or abstract data type model is that the semantics 
are inherently location independent. The concept of performing an operation on an 
object does not require the user to be aware of where objects are located or how the 
communication is actually implemented. This property gives the system the possibil-
ity of moving objects around to position them close to where they are frequently used. 
Furthermore, the issue of how many processes are involved in carrying out an opera-
tion, and where they are located is also hidden from the user. 
It is frequently convenient to impkment the object model in terms of clients (users) 
who send messages to services. A service is defined by a set of commands and 
responses. Each service is handled by one or more server processes that accept mes-
sages from clients, carry out the required work, and send back replies. The design of 
these servers and the design of the protocols they use form an important part of the 
system software of our proposed fifth generation computers. 
As an example of the problems that must be solved, consider a file server. Among 
other design issues that must be dealt with are how and where information is stored, 
how and when it is moved, how it is backed up, how concurrent reads and writes are 
controlled, how local caches are maintained, how information is named, and how 
accounting and protection are accomplished. Furthermore, the internal structure of 
the service must be designed: how many server processes are there, where are they 
located, how and when do they communicate, what happens when one of them fails, 
how is a server process organized internally for both reliability and high performance, 
and so on. Analogous questions arise for all the other servers that comprise the basic 
system software. 
2. COMMUNICATION PRIMITIVES AND PROTOCOLS 
In the literature about computer networks, one finds much discussion of the ISO OSI 
reference model [Tanenbaum81] these days. It is our belief that the price that must 
be paid in terms of complexity and performance in order to achieve an "open" system 
in the ISO sense is much too high, so we have developed a much simpler set of com-
munication primitives, which we will now describe. 
2.1. Transaction us. Stream Communication 
Most distributed systems have a connection mechanism that is based on the idea of 
two processes going to some effort to set up a connection, using the connection, and 
then tearing it down. The assumption is that a connection will be used for a stream 
of information so long that the overhead needed to set it up and tear it down are basi-
cally negligible. Most streams will consist of a file of one kind or another - a source 
program, a binary program, an input file, and so on. To see how long the average file 
is, we have conducted some measurements on the UNixt system used in our depart-
ment by the faculty and staff for research (no students, thus). The results of these 
measurements show that 34% of all files are less than 512 bytes, 52% are less than lK 
bytes, 67% are less than 2K bytes, 79% are less than 4K bytes, 88% are less than 8K 
bytes, and 94% are less than 16K bytes. 
The above considerations have led us to a different approach [Mullender84]. With 
packets of even 2K bytes, two thirds of all files fit into a single packet. Consequently, 
it is much simpler to adopt a "Request-Reply" or "Transaction" style of communica-
tion, in which the basic primitive is the client sending a request to a server and the 
t UNIX is a Trademark of Bell Laboratories. 
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server sending a reply back to the client. The client uses trans and the server 
getreq and putrep. Trans sends a request, and blocks until a reply is received. 
Getreq blocks the server until a request is received, which can then be processed, 
after which a reply can be sent using putrep. Each request-reply pair is completely 
self-contained, and independent of any other ones that may previously been sent. In 
other words, no concept of a "connection" exists. Not only is this conceptually much 
more appropriate for use in an operating system, but it is much simpler to implement 
than a complex 7-layer protocol, not to mention offering lower delay. Henceforth we 
will refer to a request-reply pair as a transaction, which is not to be confused with 
transactions with a data base. 
2.2. Basic Communication Protocol 
Instead of a 7-layer protocol, we effectively have a 4-layer protocol. The bottom layer 
is the Physical Layer, and deals with the electrical, mechanical and similar aspects of 
the network hardware. The next layer is the Port Layer, and deals with the location 
of services, the transport of (32K byte) datagrams (packets whose delivery is not 
guaranteed) from source to destination and enforces the protectiOn mechanism, which 
will be discussed in the next section. On top of this we have a layer that deals with 
the reliable transport of bounded length ( 32K byte) requests and replies between 
client and server. We have called this layer the Transaction Layer. The final layer 
has to do with the semantics of the requests and replies, for example, given that one 
can talk to the file server, what commands does it understand. The bottom three 
layers (Physical, Port and Transaction) are implemented by the kernel and hardware; 
only the Transaction Layer interface is visible to users. 
Since systems of the kind we are describing will use high-speed, highly reliable local 
networks, few, if any, of the complex mechanisms designed for flow- and error-control 
in long-haul networks are useful here. Among other things, a simple stop-and-wait 
protocol is sufficient. The main function of the Transaction Layer is to provide an 
end-to-end message service built on top of the underlying datagram service, the main 
difference being that the former uses timers and acknowledgements to guarantee 
delivery whereas the latter does not. 
The Transaction Layer protocol is straightforward. When the client does a trans, 
a packet, or sequence of packets, containing the request is sent to the server, the client 
is blocked, and a timer is started (inside the Transaction Layer). If the server does 
not acknowledge receipt of the request packet before the timer expires (usually by 
sending the reply, but in some special cases by sending a separate acknowledgement 
packet), the Transaction Layer retransmits the packet again and restarts the timer. 
When the reply finally comes in, the client sends back an acknowledgement (possibly 
piggybacked onto the next request packet) to allow the server to release any resources, 
such as buffers, that were acquired for this transaction. Under normal circumstances, 
reading a long file, for example, consists of the sequence 
From client: request for block 0 
From server: here is block 0 
From client: acknowledgement for block 0 and request for block 1 
From server: here is block 1 
etc. 
The protocol can handle the situation of a server crashing and being rebooted quite 
easily .since each request contains the capability for the file to be read and the posi-
tion in the file to start reading. Between requests, the server has no "activation 
record" or other table entry whose loss during a crash causes the server to forget 
which files were open, etc., because no concept of an open file or a current position in 
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a file e:Xists on the server's side. Each new request is completely self-contained. Of 
course for efficiency reasons, a server may keep a cache of frequently accessed i-nodes, 
file blocks etc., but these are not essential and their loss during a crash will merely 
slow the server down slightly while they are being dynamically refreshed after a 
reboot. 
2.3. The Port Layer 
The Port Layer is responsible for the speedy transmission of 32K byte datagrams. 
The Port Layer need only do this reasonably reliably, and does not have to make an 
effort to guarantee the correct delivery of every datagram. This is the responsibility 
of the Transaction Layer. Our results show that this approach leads to significantly 
higher transmission speeds, due to simpler protocols. 
Theoretically, very high speeds are achievable in modern local-area networks. A 
typical speed for DMA transfers is 1 byte/ µsec, and the typical transmission speed of a 
10 Mbit local-area network is also 1 byte/ µsec. Since DMA transfer and network 
transfer cannot overlap, but DMA at the destination host can overlap with the DMA of 
the next packet at the source host, an upper bound for the transfer rate of a typical 
local-area network is 500,000 bytes/sec point-to-point. 
In practise, however, speeds of 100,000 bytes per second between user processes have 
rarely been achieved. Obviously, to achieve higher transmission rates, the overhead of 
the protocol must be kept very low indeed, while an effort must be made to overlap 
DMAS at both communicating parties. To achieve this, we have chosen a large 
datagram size for the Port Layer, which has to split up the datagrams into small 
packets that the network hardware can cope with. This approach allows the imple-
mentor of the Port Layer to exploit the possibilities that the hardware has to offer to 
achieve an efficient stream of packets. 
Our implementation of the Port Layer interfaces to a 10 Mbit token ring that 
allows scatter-gather; that is, a packet can be sent to or from the interface in several 
DMA transfers, and then transmitted over the network separately. This allows us to 
do two important things to speed up the protocol. First, when a packet is received, 
the header can be inspected separately, so the protocol can decide where in memory 
the packet must go. The protocol driver can then transfer the packet directly from 
the interface to the right place in memory, without having to copy it. A copy loop 
would halve the transmission speed. Second, the separation of DMA and transmission 
allows the driver to prepare a transmission by doing the DMA. The transmission can 
then be initiated immediately when the signal is received that the receiver is ready. 
In our implementation of the Port Layer, these considerations have resulted in the 
protocol that will now be described. 
The transmitter begins by transferring and sending the first 2K of the datagram to 
be transmitted (2K is the maximum packet size allowed by the hardware). Immedi-
ately after the transmission is complete, the DMA for the next 2K bytes is started, but 
they are not yet transmitted. In the mean time, the receiver is interrupted by the 
arrival of the first packet. It extracts the header, examines it and decides where the 
body of the packet should go. Then the body of the packet is transferred from the 
interface to its final location in memory. While this is being done, the receiver 
prepares a tiny acknowkdgement packet to tell the transmitter it is prepared for the 
next packet. As soon as the DMA transfer of the previous packet has finished, this 
acknowledgement is sent back to the transmitter. When the transmitter receives it, 
the transfer of the next packet to the interface will have finished, so it can then be 
sent immediately. This sequence is continued until the whole datagram is transmit-
ted. 
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2.4. The Transaction Layer 
It is the responsibility of the Transaction Layer to guarantee the arrival of requests 
and replies. The Transaction Layer makes use of the Port Layer and timers to 
achieve this. 
The interface to the transaction layer basically consists of three calls, one for 
clients, and two for servers. All calls use a small datastructure, called Mref, which 
contains a pointer to a small fixed-size out-of-band buffer for the transmission of com-
mands and parameters to the server, a pointer to the main body of data to be 
transferred, and the length of the main body of data (Oto 32768), as follows: 
typedef struct Mref { 
char *M oob; 
char *M-buf; 
unsigned (~Len; 
} Mref; 
Cap { typedef struct 
Port 
char 
C port; 
C-private[10J; 
capability */ } Cap; 
'* The client, in order to do a transaction calls 
transCcap, req, rep); 
Cap *cap; 
Mref *req, *rep; 
The server receives requests and sends replies with 
getreqCport, cap, req); 
Port *port; 
Cap *cap; 
Mref *req; 
putrepCrep); 
Mref *rep; 
I* 6-byte port */ 
I* 10-byte private */ 
In principle, the Transaction Layer works as follows: When a client calls trans, 
the Transaction Layer generates a reply-port to enable the server to send a reply. 
The server port is deduced from the capability; the first 48 bits of the capability for 
an object identify the service that controls the object. The request is then sent, using 
put, and a retransmission timer is started. 
The server, which previously had made a call to getreq, receives the request; the 
capability is filled in, and the received message is put in the buffers referred to by 
req. As soon as the request is received, the server's Transaction Layer starts a piggy-
back timer. When the server has not sent a reply before this timer expires, a separate 
acknowledgement is sent to put the client at ease, and stop its retransmission timer. 
When the server sends a reply to the client the same thing happens, more or less, with 
the role of client and server reversed. When a client makes a sequence of transactions 
with a single server, a subsequent request will acknowledge receipt of the previous 
reply. 
The client maintains one more timer, the crash timer. This timer is set when the 
server's acknowledgement to a request has been received, and is used to detect server 
crashes. Whenever this timer expires, the client sends an "are you still alive?" packet 
to the server, to which the server replies with an acknowledgement. 
When transactions occur quickly, one after the other, no extra acknowledgements 
are sent at all. Only when transactions take a long time (say, longer than a minute), 
acknowledgements are sent, and when transactions take much longer than that (say, 
ten minutes) then "are you still alive" messages begin to be sent. 
2.5. Timer Management 
If the timers are started and stopped in exactly the way described above, the Transac-
tion Layer would become unacceptably slow. Per (quick) transaction, two retransmis-
sion timers and two piggyback timers would have to be started and stopped, eight 
timer actions altogether. 
There is a much more efficient way of dealing with timers, one that makes use of a 
sweep algorithm. This algorithm does not implement very· accurate timers, but accu-
racy of the timer intervals is not very important to the correct and efficient operation 
of the protocol. 
The sweep algorithm is run every N clock ticks. N must be chosen such that N 
ticks is about the minimum timer interval needed (the piggyback timer interval). 
Whenever the algorithm is called, it makes a sweep over all outstanding transactions. 
If the state of a transaction has changed, the new state is recorded. If it has not 
changed, a counter is incremented, telling for how long the state has remained the 
same. If the (state, counter) combination has reached a certain value, the sweep algo-
rithm carries out the appropriate actions, usually sending an acknowledgement, 
retransmitting a message, or aborting a transaction. 
Because this algorithm is used there is no code needed in the transaction code itself, 
reducing the overhead of the Transaction Layer significantly. In this way, the code 
executed in the Transaction Layer is optimised for the normal case (no errors). 
2.6. Bwckirig vs. Non-Bwckirig Transaction Primitives 
Most services need to be able to handle multiple requests from different clients simul-
taneously. It therefore seems natural to implement non-blocking calls for interprocess 
communication, as this will allow a service to react to events in the order they occur. 
When blocking communication calls are used, a server is forced to wait for the specific 
event that unblocks the call. 
Because it is rather difficult to write correct code for a process which has to handle 
multiple flows of control indeterministically, the Amoeba system provides the concept 
of tasks, sharing an address space. A number of tasks in one address space forms a 
clust;er, and specific rules govern the scheduling of tasks within a cluster: only one 
task can run at a time, and a task runs until it voluntarily relinquishes control (e.g., 
on trans and getreq calls). 
A server can thus easily be structured as a collection of co-operating tasks, each task 
handling one request. This model has greatly simplified the structure of services, as 
each task making up the server cluster now has a single thread of execution. The 
mode\ also obviated the need for non-blocking transaction calls, with their compli-
cated (and slow) extra interface for handling interrupts. 
2.7. Results 
Two versions of the algorithm have now been implemented. The one described has 
been implemented on the Amoeba distributed operating system, and achieves over 
300,000 bytes a second from user process to user process (using M68000s and a 
Pronet* ring). It is now being implemented under UNIX where we expect to obtain 
more than 200,000 bytes/sec, assuming the communicating processes are not swapped. 
* PRONET is a trademark of Proteon Associates, Inc. 
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An older version of the protocol, using 2K byte datagrams, now gets 90,000 
bytes/sec across the network between two VAX-750s running a normal load of work, 
without causing a significant load on the system itself. 
Several services, implemented under UNIX, are using the Transaction Layer inter-
face, and it is our experience that these services are easy to design and that they work 
efficiently. 
3. PORTS AND CAPABILITIES 
3.1. Ports 
Every service has one or more ports [Mullender82b] to which client processes can send 
messages to contact the service. Ports consist of large numbers, typically 48 bits, 
which are known only to the server processes that comprise the service, and to the 
service's clients. For a public service, such as the system file service, the port will be 
generally made known to all users. The ports used by an ordinary user process will, 
in general, be kept secret. Knowledge of a port is taken by the system as prima facie 
evidence that the sender has a right to communicate with the service. Of course the 
service is not required to carry out work for clients just because they know the port, 
for example, the public file service may refuse to read or write files for clients lacking 
account numbers, appropriate authorization, etc. 
Although the port mechanism provides a convenient way to provide partial authen-
tication of clients ("if you know the port, you may at least talk to the service"), it 
does not deal with the authentication of servers. The basic primitive operations 
offered by the system are trans, putreq and getrep. Since everyone knows the 
port of the file server, as an example, how does one insure that malicious users do not 
execute getreqs on the file server's port, in effect impersonating the file server to the 
rest of the system? 
One approach is to have all ports manipulated by kernels that are presumed 
trustworthy and are supposed to know who may getreq from which port. We reject 
this strategy because some machines, e.g., personal computers connected to larger mul-
timodule systems may not be trustworthy, and also because we believe that by mak-
ing the kernel as small as possible, we can enhance the reliability of the system as a 
whole. Instead, we have chosen a different solution that can be implemented in either 
hardware or software. First we will describe the hardware solution; later we will 
describe the software solution. 
In the hardware solution, we need to place a small interface box, which we call an 
F-box (Function-box) between each processor module and the network. The most log-
ical place to put it is on the VLSI chip that is used to interface to the network. Alter-
natively, it can be put on a small printed circuit board inside the wall socket through 
which personal computers attach to the network. In those cases where the processors 
have user mode and kernel mode and a trusted operating system running in kernel 
mode, it can also be put into operating system software. In any event, we assume 
that somehow or other all packets entering and leaving every processor undergo a sim-
ple transformation that users cannot bypass. 
The transformation works like this. Each port is really a pair of ports, P, and G, 
related by: P = F(G), where F is a (publicly-known) one-way function [Wilkes68, 
Purdy74, Evans74] performed by the F-box. The one-way function has the property 
that given G it is a straightforward computation to find P, but that given P, finding 
G is so difficult that the only approach is to try every possible G to see which one 
produces P. If P and G contain sufficient bits, this approach can be made to take 
millions of years on the world's largest supercomputer, thus making it effectively 
impossible to find G given only P. Note that a one-way function differs from a cryp-
tographic transformation in the sense that the latter must have an inverse to be 
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useful, but the former has been carefully chosen so that no inverse can be found. 
F-box also says 
send toP 
Client says 
send to P 
CLIENT 
INTRUDER 
Intruder does'n 
knowG 
FIGURE 1. 
F-box actually listens 
for P = F(G) 
Server says 
listen for G 
SERVER 
Using the one-way F-box, the server authentication can be handled in a simple way, 
illustrated in FIGURE 1. Each server chooses a get-port, G, and computes the 
corresponding put-port, P. The get-port is kept secret; the put-port is distributed to 
potential clients or in the case of public servers, is published. When the server is 
ready to accept client requests, it does a getreqCG, cap, req). The F-box then 
computes P = F ( G) and waits for packets containing P to arrive. When one arrives, 
it is given to the appropriate process. To send a packet to the server, the client 
merely does t rans C cap, req, rep), where the port field of cap is set to P. This 
will cause a datagram to be sent by the local F-box with P in the destination-port 
field of the header. The F-box on the sender's side does not perform any transforma-
tion on the P field of the outgoing packet. 
Now let us consider the system from an intruder's point of view. To impersonate a 
server, the intruder must do getreq( G, · · · ). However, G is a well-kept secret, 
and is never transmitted on the network, Since we have assumed that G cannot be 
deduced from P (the one-way property of F) and that the intruder cannot circumvent 
the F-box, he cannot intercept packets not intended for him. Replies from the server 
to the client are protected the same way, only with the client's Transaction Layer 
picking a get-port for the reply, say, G', and including P' = F(G') in the request 
packet. 
The presence of the F-box makes it easy to implement digital signatures for still 
further authentication, if that is desired. To do so, each client chooses a random sig-
nature, 8, and publishes F(8). The F-box must be designed to work as follows. Each 
packet presented to the F-box contains three special header fields: destination (P), 
reply (G'), and signature (8). The F-box applies the one-way function to the second 
and third of these, transmitting the three ports as: P, F(G'), and F(8), respectively. 
The first is used by the receiver's F-box to admit only packets for which the 
corresponding getreq has been done, the second is used as the put-port for the 
reply, and the third can be used to authenticate the sender, since only the true owner 
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of the signature will kno.w what number to put in the third field to insure that the 
publicly-known F(S) comes out. 
It is important to note that the F-box arrangement merely provides a simple 
mechanism for implementing security and protection, but gives operating system 
designers considerable latitude for choosing various policies. The mechanism is 
sufficiently flexible and general that it should be possible to put it into hardware with 
precluding many as-yet-unthought-of operating systems to be designed in the future. 
3.2. Capabilities 
In any object-based system, a mechanism is needed to keep track of which processes 
may access which objects and in what way. The normal way is to associate a capabil-
ity with each object, with bits in the capability indicating which operations the holder 
of the capability may perform. In a distributed system this mechanism should itself 
be distributed, that is, not centralized in a single monolithic "capability manager." In 
our proposed scheme, each object is managed by some service, which is a user (as 
opposed to kernel) program, and which understands the capabilities for its objects. 
SERVER RANDOM 
FIGURE 2. 
A capability typically consists of four fields, as illustrated in FIGURE 2: 
1. The put-port of the service that manages the object 
2. An Object Number meaningful only to the service managing the object 
3. A Rights Field, which contains a 1 bit for each permitted operation 
4. A Random Number for protecting each object 
The basic model of how capabilities are used can be illustrated by a simple example: a 
client wishes to create a file using the file service, wpte some data into the file, and 
then give another client permission to read (but not modify) the file just written. To 
start with, the client sends a message to the file service's put-port specifying that a 
file is to be created. The request might contain a file name, account number and simi-
lar attributes, depending on the exact nature of the file service. The server would 
then pick a random number, store this number in its object table, and insert it into 
the newly-formed object capability. The reply would contain this capability for the 
newly created (empty) file. 
To write the file, the client would send a message containing the capability and 
some data. When the w r i t e request arrived at the file server process, the server 
would normally use the object number contained in the capability as as index into its 
tables to locate the object. For a UNIX like file server, the object number would be the 
i-node number, which could be used to locate the i-node. 
Several object protection systems are possible using this framework. In the simplest 
one, the server merely compares the random number in the file table (put there by the 
server when the object was created) to the one contained in the capability. If they 
agree, the capability is assumed to be genuine, and all operations on the file are 
allowed. This system is easy to implement, but does not distinguish between read, 
write, delete, and other operations that may be performed on objects. 
Ho~ever, it can easily be modified to provide that distinction. In the modified ver-
sion, when a file (object) is created, the random number chosen and stored in the file 
table is used as an encryption/decryption key. The capability is built up by taking 
the Rights Field (e.g., 8 bits), which is initially all ls indicating that all operations are 
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legal, and the Random Number Field (e.g., 56 bits), which contains a known constant, 
say, 0, and treating them as a single number. This number is then encrypted by the 
key just stored in the file table, and the result put into the newly minted capability in 
the combined Rights-Random Field. When the capability is returned for use, the 
server uses the object number (not encrypted) to find the file table and hence the 
encryption/decryption key. If the result of decrypting the capability leads to the 
known constant in the Random Number Field, the capability is almost assuredly 
valid, and the Rights Field can be believed. Clearly, an encryption function that 
mixes the bits thoroughly is required to ensure that tampering with the Rights Field 
also affects the known constant. Exclusive or'ing a constant with the concatenated 
Rights and Random fields will not do. 
When this modified protection system is used, the owner of the object can easily 
give an exact copy of the capability to another process by just sending it the bit pat-
tern, but to pass, say, read-only access, is harder. To accomplish this task, the process 
must send the capability back to the server along with a bit mask and a request to 
fabricate a new capability whose Rights Field is the Boolean-and of the Rights Field 
in the capability and the bit mask. By choosing the bit mask carefully, the capability 
owner can mask out any operations that the recipient is not permitted to carry out. 
This modified system works well except that it requires going back to the server 
every time a sub-capability with fewer rights is needed. We have devised yet another 
protection system that does not have this drawback. This third scheme requires the 
use of a set of N commutative one-way functions, F 0, Fi. · · · , F N _ 1 corresponding 
to the N rights present in the Rights Field. When an object is created, the server 
chooses a random number and puts it in both the file table and the Random Number 
Field, just as in the first scheme presented. It also sets all the Rights Field bits to 1. 
server gives 
client capability 
containing R 
R, all rights 
client turns off 
bit i and 
gives cap. to X 
Fi (R ), all rights 
except i 
FIGURE 3. 
X turns off 
bitj and 
gives cap. to Y 
Y gives cap. to server 
server applies F; and Fj 
to R in object to verify 
A client can delete permission k from a capability by replacing the random number, 
R, with Fk (R ) and turning off the corresponding bit in the Rights Field. When a 
capability comes into the server to be used, the server fetches the original random 
number from the file table, looks at the Rights Field, and applies the functions 
corresponding to the deleted rights to it. If the result agrees with the number present 
in the capability, then the capability is accepted as genuine, otherwise it is rejected. 
The mechanism is illustrated in FIGURE 3. Note that although the Rights Field is not 
encrypted, it is pointless for a client to tamper with it, since the server will detect 
that immediately. In theory at least, the Rights Field is not even needed, since the 
server could try all 2N combinations of the functions to see if any worked. Its pres-
ence ~rely speeds up the checking. It should also be clear why the functions must 
be commutative - it does not matter in what order the bits in the Rights Field were 
turned off. 
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The organization of capabilities and objects discussed above has the interesting pro-
perty that although no central record is kept of who has which capabilities, it is easy 
to retract existing capabilities. All that the owner of an object need do is ask the 
server to change the random number stored in the file table. Obviously this operation 
must be protected with a bit in the Rights Field, but if it succeeds, all existing capa-
bilities are instantly invalidated. 
3.3. Protection without F-Boxes 
Earlier we said that protection could also be achieved without F-boxes. It is slightly 
more complicated, since it uses both conventional and public-key encryption, but it is 
still quite usable. The basic idea underlying the method is the fact that in nearly all 
networks an intruder can forge nearly all parts of a packet being sent except the 
source address, which is supplied by the network interface hardware. To take advan-
tage of this property, imagine a (possibly symmetric) conceptual matrix of conven-
tional (e.g., DES) encryption keys, with the rows being labeled by source machine and 
the columns by destination machine. Thus the matrix selects a unique key for 
encrypting the capabilities in any packet. The data need not be encrypted, although 
that is also possible if needed. 
Each machine is assumed to know its row and column of the matrix, and nothing 
else (how this will be achieved will be discussed shortly). With this arrangement, 
intruder I can easily capture packets from client C to server S, but attempts to "play 
them back" to the server will fail because the server will see the source machine as I 
(assumed unforgeable) and use element M18 as the decryption key instead of the 
correct Mes· No matter what the intruder does, he cannot trick the server into using 
a decryption key that decrypts the capabilities to make sense, that is, to contain ran-
dom numbers that agree with those stored in the file tables. 
To avoid having to run the encryption/decryption algorithm frequently, all 
machines can maintain a hashed cache of capabilities that they have been using fre-
quently. Clients will hash their caches on the unencrypted capabilities in the form of 
triples: (unencrypted capability, destination, encrypted capability), whereas servers 
will hash theirs in the form of triples: (encrypted capability; source, unencrypted 
capability) .. 
To set up the matrix initially, the following procedure can be used. A public server, 
such as a :file server, makes its put-port and a public encryption key known to the 
whole world. When a new machine joins the network (e.g., after a crash or upon ini-
tial system boot), it sends a broadcast message announcing its presence. Suppose, for 
example, the file server has just come up, and must (1) prove that it is the file server 
to other processes, and (2) establish the conventional keys used for encrypting capabil-
ities in both directions. 
A client machine, C, which receives the broadcast from the alleged file server, F, 
picks a new conventional encryption key, K, for use in subsequent C to F traffic and 
sends it to F encrypted with F's public key. F then decrypts K and replies to C by 
sending a packet containing both K and a newly chosen conventional key to be used 
for reverse traffic. This packet is encrypted both with K itself and with the inverse of 
F's public key, so C can use K and F's public key to decrypt it. If the decrypted 
packet contains K, C can be sure that the other conventional key was indeed gen-
erated by the owner of F's public key, thus convincing C that he is indeed talking to 
the file server. Both of the above-mentioned conditions have now been fulfilled, so 
normal communication can now take place. Note that the use of different conven-
tional ,keys after each reboot make it impossible for an intruder to fool anyone by 
playing back old packets. 
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4. THE AMOEBA FILE SYSTEM 
The file system has been designed to be highly modular, both to enhance reliability 
and to provide a convenient testbed for doing research on distributed file systems. It 
consists of three completely independent pieces: the block service, the file service, and 
the directory service. In short, the block service provides commands to read and write 
raw disk blocks. As far as it is concerned, no two blocks are related in any way, that 
is, it has no concept of a file or other aggregation of blocks. The file service uses the 
block service to build up files with various properties. Finally, the directory service 
provides a mapping of symbolic names onto object capabilities. 
4.1. Block Service 
The block service is responsible for managing raw disk storage. It provides an object-
oriented interface to the outside world to relieve file servers from having to under-
stand the details of how disks work. The principle operations it performs are: 
- al locate a block, write data into it, and return a capability to the block 
- given a capability for a block, free the block 
- given a capability for a block, read and return the data contained in it 
- given a capability for a block and some data, write the data into the block 
- given a capability for a block and a key, lock or unlock the block 
These primitives provide a convenient object-oriented interface for file servers to use. 
In fact, any client who is unsatisfied [Stonebraker81, Tanenbaum82] with the stan-
dard file system can use these operations to construct his own. 
The first four operations of al locate, free, read, and write hardly need 
much comment. The fifth one provides a way for clients to lock individual blocks. 
Although this mechanism is crude, it forms a sufficient basis for clients (e.g., file sys-
tems) to construct more elaborate locking schemes, should they so desire. One other 
operation is worth noting. The data within a block is entirely under the control of 
the processes possessing capabilities for it, but we expect that most file servers will use 
a small portion of the data for redundancy purposes. For example, a file server might 
use the first 32 bits of data to contain a file number, and the next 32 bits to contain a 
relative block number within the file. The block server supports an operation 
recovery, in which the client provides the account number it uses in al locate 
operations and requests a list of all capabilities on the whole disk containing this 
account number. (The block server stores the account number for each block in a 
place not accessible to clients.) Although recovery is a very expensive operation, in 
effect requiring a search of the entire disk, armed with all the capabilities returned, a 
file server that lost all of its internal tables in a crash could use the first 64 bits of 
each block to rebuild its entire file list from scratch. 
4.2. File Service 
The purpose of splitting the block service and file service is to make it easy to provide 
a multiplicity of different file services for different applications. One such file service 
that we envision is one that supports flat files with no locking, in other words, the 
UNIX model of a file as a linear sequence of bytes with no internal structure a'nd essen-
tially no concurrency control. This model is quite straightforward and will therefore 
not be discussed here further. 
A more elaborate file service with explicit version and concurrency control for a 
multiuser environment will be described instead [Mullender82a]. This file service is 
designed to support data base services, but it itself is just an ordinary, albeit slightly 
advari:ced, file service. The basic model behind this file service is that a file is a time-
ordered sequence of versions, each version being a snapshot of the file made at a 
moment determined by a client. At any instant, exactly one version of the file is the 
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current version . · To use a file, a client sends a message to a file server process con-
taining a file capability and a request to create a new, private version of the current 
version. The server returns a capability for this new version, which acts like it is a 
block for block copy of the current version made at the instant of creation. In other 
words, no matter what other changes may happen to the file while the client is using 
his private version, none of them are visible to him. Only changes he makes himself 
are visible. 
Of course, for implementation efficiency, the file is not really copied block for block. 
What actually happens is that when a version is created, a table of pointers (capabili-
ties) to all the file's blocks is created. The capability granted to the client for the new 
version actually refers to this version table rather than the file itself. Whenever the 
client reads a block from the file, a bit is set in the version. table to indicate that the 
corresponding block has been read. When a block is modified in the version, a new 
block is allocated using the block server, the new block replaces the original one, and 
its capability is inserted into the version table. A bit indicating that the block is a 
new one rather than an original is also set. This mechanism is sometimes called "copy 
on write." 
Versions that have been created and modified by a client are called uncommitted 
versions. At a particular moment, the current version may have several (different) 
uncommitted versions derived from it in use by different clients. When a client is 
finished modifying his private version, he can ask the file server to commit his version, 
that is, make it the current version instead of the then current version. If the version 
from which the to-be-committed version was derived is still current at the time of the 
commit, the commit succeeds and becomes the new current version. 
1.1 
1.2.1 
1.2 
current 
1.2.2 
FIGURE 4. 
1.3 
1.2.3 
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As an example~ suppose version 1 is initially the current version, with various clients 
creating private versions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 based on it. If version 1.2 is the first to com-
mit, it wins and 1.2 becomes the new current version, as illustrated in FIGURE 4. Sub-
sequent requests by other clients to create a version will result in versions 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 
and 1.2.3, all initially copies of 1.2. 
The fun begins when the owner of version 1.3 now tries to commit. Version 1, on 
which it is based, is no longer the current version, so a problem arises. To see how 
this should be handled, we must introduce a concept from the data base world, 
serializability [Eswaran76, Papadimitriou79]. Two updates to a file are said to be 
serializable if the net result is either the same as if they were run sequentially in 
either order. As a simple example, consider a two character file initially containing 
"ab." Client 1 wants to write a "c" into the first character, wait a while, and then 
write a "d" into the second character. Client 2 wants to write an "e" into the first 
character, wait a while, and then write an "f' into the second character. If 1 runs 
first we get "cd"; if 2 runs first we get "ef." Both of these are legal results, since the 
file server cannot dictate when the users run. However, its job is to prevent final 
configurations of "cf' or "de," both of which result from interleaving the requests. If 
a client locks the file before starting, does all its work, and then unlocks the file, the 
result will always be either "cd" or "ef," but never "cf' or "de." What we are trying 
to do is accomplish the same goal without using locking. 
The idea behind not locking is that most updates, even on the same file, do not 
affect the same parts of the file, and hence do not conflict. For example, changes to 
an airline re8ervation data base for flights from San Francisco to Los Angeles do not 
conflict with changes for flights from Amsterdam to London. The strategy behind our 
commit mechanism is to let everyone make and modify versions at will, with a check 
for serializability when a commit is attempted. This mechanism has been proposed 
for data base systems [Kung81], but as far as we know, not for file systems. 
The serializability check is straightforward. If a version to be committed, A , is 
based on the version that is still current, B, it is serializable and the commit succeeds. 
If it is not, a check must be made to see if all of the blocks belonging to A that the 
client has read are the same in the current version as they were in the version from 
which A was derived. If so, the previous commit or commits only changed blocks 
that the client trying to commit A was not using, so there is no problem and the com-
mit can succeed. 
If, however, some blocks have been changed, modifications that A 's owner has made 
may be based on data that are now obsolete, so the commit must be refused, but a list 
is returned to A 's owner of blocks that caused conflicts, that is, blocks marked "read" 
in A and marked "written" in the current version (or any of its ancestors up to the 
version on which A is based). At this point, A 's owner can make a new version and 
start all over again. Our assumption is that this event is very unlikely, and that is 
occasional occurrence is a price worth paying for not having locking, deadlocks, and 
the delays associated with waiting for locks. 
4.3. Directory Service 
Because it is frequently inconvenient to deal with long binary bit strings such as capa-
bilities, a directory service is needed to provide symbolic naming. The directory 
service's task is to manage directories, each of which contains a collection of (ASCII 
name, capability) pairs. The principal operation on a directory object is for a client to 
present a capability for a directory and an ASCII name, and request the directory ser-
vice to look up and return the capability associated with the ASCII name. The inverse 
operation is to store an (ASCII name, capability) pair in a directory whose capability is 
presented. 
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5. PROCESS MANAGEMENT 
Like any other operating system, this one must also have a way to manage processes. 
In our design, processes are created and managed by the process service, which con-
sists of three major subsystems, the generic server, the process server, and the boot 
server. 
5.1. Generic Server 
The idea behind the generic server is that much of the time a user wants a certain 
program to be run, but does not care about where it is run or on which CPU type. For 
example, a user might have a Pascal program to be compiled, and wants a Pascal com-
piler that produces, say, Motorola 68000 code. However, he does not care whether the 
compiler itself runs on a 68000, a VAX or any other CPU. We speak of this as a generic 
Pascal compiler. 
The generic server's job is to locate a suitable hardware/software combination and 
start it up. This can be done by maintaining internal tables of locations where the 
appropriate service is likely to be located. By sending a message to the chosen service, 
the generic server can see if the corresponding server is currently available and willing 
to take on the offered work. If so, it can begin; if not, the generic server can broad-
cast a request for bids to see if someone else can be located. If no willing server exists, 
the generic server will have to cause one to be created by invoking the process server. 
5.2. Process Server 
The process server's job is to take a process descriptor sent to it, locate a free proces-
sor, and send sufficient information to the processor to allow the processor to run. 
The process descriptor must contain at least the following information: 
1. The CPU type desired. 
2. A capability for the binary file to be executed. 
3. Capabilities for process environment. 
4. Accounting information. 
The CPU type and binary file capability are obvious. The third item has to do with 
things like the file descriptors and environment strings in UNIX. · When a UNIX process 
is started up, it inherits certain parameters from its parent, among these are usually 
file descriptors for standard input, output, and diagnostic, and possibly other files as 
well. In our design, a process can inherit capabilities for standard input, standard 
output, and standard diagnostic, as well as other ones. By using these, one can imple-
ment UNIX pipes and filters easily, as well as more general mechanisms (e.g., passing 
capabilities to third parties, storing them in files for later use, etc.). 
Another area that the process service must deal with is scheduling. It must allocate 
processes to processors, and possibly control migration and swapping among processors 
as well. By introducing the concept of a "process image" which contains all the infor-
mation necessary to run a process (e.g., its memory, registers, capabilities, etc.) it 
becomes straightforward to handle process migration and swapping in a unified way. 
When a process is swapped out to a disk somewhere, there is no need to have it 
swapped back to the same machine that it originated on. 
5.3. Boot Service 
Many services must achieve high availability. Our approach to this issue is using 
fault tolerance, rather than fault intolerance. In the former, one expects hardware 
and software to fail, and makes provision for dealing with it; in the latter, one 
assumes that they are perfect and that no such provision need be made. Since many 
services are faced with the same problem: how to provide high availability in the face 
of occasional crashes, we have abstracted out a common part of the crash recovery 
- 17 -
mechanism and put it into a separate service, the boot service. 
Any service that wants to provide a continuous availability can register with the 
boot service. Such registration entails providing a polling message to send the service 
periodically, the expect reply, the polling frequency, and a prescription of what to do 
in case of failure. The boot service then sends the polling message to the service at 
the requested frequency. As long as the service continues to send the appropriate 
reply, all is well and the boot service has nothing else to do. 
However, if the service fails to reply properly, or fails to reply at all within an 
agreed upon time interval, the boot service declares the service to be out-of-order, and 
goes to the process service to start up a new version of it. Of course, the boot service 
itself must not crash, but it consists of a number of server processes that constantly 
check each other, and if need be, replace sick members with healthy ones. 
6. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
In keeping with our general philosophy of making the system kernel as small as possi-
ble, we have devised a way to put the resource control and accounting outside the ker-
nel. Furthermore, a clear distinction is made between policy and mechanism, so that 
subsystem designers can implement their own policies with the standard mechanisms. 
Traditionally, accounting was used by the management of a computer center to levy 
charges for the use of the computer center's resources: CPU time, file space, lineprinter 
paper. This method worked quite well in the past, when hardware resources were 
expensive compared to the software used. Nowadays, hardware is cheap, software 
expensive. However, in the traditional approach there is usually no possibility to bill 
users for the use of a particular piece of software, or to have one user bill another for 
using his services. 
Additionally, distributed systems need not be under control of one centralized 
management any more; private, personal computers can be plugged into the network 
and both use and offer services to the rest of the network. The accounting mechan-
isms in a distributed systems must be able to handle this new view on operating sys-
tems and allow any user that sets up a service to gather information about who uses 
his service. 
6.1. Bank Service 
The bank service is the heart of the resource management mechanism. It implements 
an object called a "bank account" with operations to transfer virtual money between 
accounts and to inspect the status of accounts. Bank accounts come in two varieties: 
individual and business. Most users of the system will just have one individual 
account containing all their virtual money. This money is used to pay for CPU time, 
disk blocks, typesetter pages, and all other resources for which the service owning the 
resource decides to levy a charge. 
Business accounts are used by services to keep track of who has paid them and how 
much. Each business account has a subaccount for each registered client. When a 
client transfers money from his individual account to the service's business account, 
the money transferred is kept in the subaccount for that client, so the service can 
later ascertain each client's balance. As an example of how this mechanism works, a 
file service could charge for each disk block written, deducting some amount from the 
client's balance. When the balance reached zero, no more blocks could be written. 
Large advance payments and simple caching strategies can reduce the number of mes-
sages sent to a small number. 
Another aspect of the bank service is its maintenance of multiple currencies. It can 
keep track of say, virtual dollars, virtual yen, virtual guilders and other virtual curren-
cies, with or without the possibility of conversion among them. This feature makes it 
easy for subsystem designers to create new currencies and control how they are 
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allocated among· the subsystems users. 
6.2. Accounting Policies 
The bank service described above allows different subsystems to have different 
accounting policies. For example, a file or block service could decide to use either a 
buy-sell or a rental model for accounting. In the former, whenever a block was allo-
cated to a client, the client's account with the service would be debited by the cost of 
one block. When the block was freed, the account would be credited. This scheme 
provides a way to implement absolute limits (quotas) on resource use. In the latter 
model, the client is charged for rental of blocks at a rate of X units per kiloblock-
second or block-month or something else. In this model, virtual money is constantly 
flowing from the clients to the servers, in which case clients need some form of income 
to keep them going. The policy about how income is generated and dispensed is 
determined by the owner of the currency in question, and is outside the scope of the 
bank server. 
7. SUMMARY 
This paper has discussed a model for a fifth generation computer system architecture 
and its operating system. The operating system is based on the use of objects pro-
tected by sparse capabilities. An outline of some of the key services has been given, 
notably the block, file, directory, generic, process, boot and bank services. 
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